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ABSTRACT
In 1986, Congress passed the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”) to provide additional protections for individuals’ private
communications content held in electronic storage by third parties.
Acting out of direct concern for the implications of the Third-Party
Records Doctrine—a judicially created doctrine that generally
eliminates Fourth Amendment protections for information
entrusted to third parties—Congress sought to tailor the SCA to
electronic communications sent via and stored by third parties. Yet,
because Congress crafted the SCA with language specific to the
technology of 1986, courts today have struggled to apply the SCA
consistently with regard to similar private content sent using
different technologies.
This Article argues that Congress should revisit the SCA and
adopt a single, technology-neutral standard of protection for
private communications content held by third-party service
providers. Furthermore, it suggests that Congress specifically
intended to limit the scope of the Third-Party Records Doctrine by
creating greater protections via the SCA, and thus courts
interpreting existing law should afford protection to new
technologies such as social media communications consistent with
that intent based on individuals’ expressed privacy preferences.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, social networking platforms such as
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Google+ have exploded in popularity,
fundamentally changing the way individuals and organizations
communicate. Facebook, the world’s largest social networking platform,
currently claims more than one billion monthly active users.1 Twitter
recently surpassed the 200 million monthly active user mark,2 while
LinkedIn and Google+ claim more than 160 and 135 million monthly active

1

Company Info, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited Nov.
18, 2014).
2
Darrell Etherington, Twitter Passes 200M Monthly Active Users, TECHCRUNCH
(Dec. 18, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/12/18/twitter-passes-200m-monthlyactive-users-a-42-increase-over-9-months/.
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users, respectively.3 As these companies continue to develop the
functionality and expand the reach of their social networking platforms, so
too will users continue to increase their reliance on social media for an even
wider range of communication needs. And because these platforms provide
varying communication channels—from wall posts and tweets to direct
messages and private chats—users will eventually and necessarily foster
varying expectations of privacy with regard to each communication
channel.
Yet for a variety of legal and practical reasons, it remains unclear
whether Fourth Amendment protections extend to communications shared
and stored online. Although Congress sought to remedy this uncertainty in
1986 by enacting the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),4 courts have
embraced varying and often contradictory interpretations of the Act’s
language, especially when applying the statute to modern technology that
did not exist at the time of its enactment.5 As a result, seemingly private
electronic communications, such as e-mails stored on Gmail or private
messages saved on Facebook, may not receive full privacy protection under
the SCA, whereas semi-public wall posts could potentially trigger the Act’s
highest protections.6 In all cases, however, since these electronic
communications are “records” entrusted to “third parties” by individuals,
but for the SCA they would enjoy no Fourth Amendment protection due to
the Third-Party Records Doctrine (“TPRD”).7
Recent events suggesting expansive federal surveillance operations
based on the acquisition of information from these third-party providers
further highlight the importance of addressing the role of Fourth
Amendment protections for online communications. The protections in the
3

Salvador Rodriguez, LinkedIn Had 160 Million Active Users, Up 20% in Two
Months, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/
2013/jan/14/business/la-fi-tn-linkedin-160-million-members-20130114;
Amir
Errata, Google+ Announces 135 Million Users, Debuts Instagram Competitor,
WALL ST. J. TECH. BLOG (Dec. 6. 2012, 9:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
digits/2012/12/06/google-announces-135-million-users-debuts-instagramcompetitor/.
4
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555; see infra
pp. 5–7.
5
Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1211–12 (2004).
6
For further discussion of statutory protections afforded to private messages and
wall posts, see infra Part II.B.1–2.
7
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443–44 (1976) (holding that an
individual does not have a Fourth Amendment interest in bank records released to a
third party); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (holding that
the installation and use of a pen register device does not constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment).
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SCA are critical in an age where Gmail, Facebook, and Skype have nearly
replaced the use of the Postal Service and telephone system for regular
communication. Furthermore, this shift in technology and the resulting
ambiguity of protection under the SCA demonstrate the shortcomings of the
TPRD and suggest that Congress sought to limit the scope of this doctrine
to certain contexts such as personal correspondence.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a brief
contextual background of the SCA and its interaction with the TPRD. It
summarizes the SCA’s legislative history, provides an overview of the
statute’s key components, and lays a foundation suggesting Congress’s
intent to provide privacy protections limiting the scope of the TPRD. Part
II examines the current split between the traditional interpretation of the
SCA—as promulgated by the Department of Justice and most recently
embraced by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Jennings v.
Jennings—and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation as to whether opened emails are held in “electronic storage” as defined by the Act. It then
proceeds to address the SCA’s application in the context of social media
and examines empirical data relating to the efficacy of social networking
platforms’ privacy settings. Part III suggests Congress amend the SCA in
order to return the Act to its original intent: providing universal privacy
protections for private electronic communications regardless of whether
those communications are in transit or in storage. This Article further
recommends Congress adopt technology-neutral statutory language, which
has enduring as opposed to temporary efficacy, to protect more effectively
communications content now and in the future. It suggests language to help
effect this goal and also provides suggestions for how courts should act in
the interim to preserve the additional protections Congress created with the
SCA, which are directly responsive to the Supreme Court’s recognition of
the TPRD.

I. A BRIEF CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE SCA
The SCA is a federal statute that governs the privacy of stored
Internet communications.8 Congress enacted the SCA in 1986 to provide a
set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections for communications
made online because it was, and still remains, largely unclear whether
traditional Fourth Amendment protections extend to the online context.9
Professor Orin Kerr suggests three reasons why the constitutional
8

Kerr, supra note 5, at 1208. Some states have statutes analogous to the federal
SCA, including Texas, Florida, and Minnesota. See Fernando M. Pinguelo &
Bradford W. Muller, Virtual Crimes, Real Damages: A Primer On Cybercrimes In
The United States and Efforts to Combat Cybercriminals, 16 VA. J. L. & TECH.
116, 150-188 (2011) (setting forth a multi-state survey of cyber-related statutes).
9
Id. at 1210–11.
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protections against unreasonable searches and seizures may not reach the
virtual world. First, Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence has created
“uncertainty over whether and when Internet users can retain a ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ in information sent to network providers, including
e-mails.”10 In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court established the
third-party doctrine, which denies Fourth Amendment protections to
information disclosed to an entity not originally party to the
communication.11 Because virtually all Internet communications are shared
with a network service provider, i.e., a third party, users may be
categorically prohibited from enjoying a reasonable expectation of privacy
online. Second, Fourth Amendment rules governing grand jury subpoenas
suggest that the government may subpoena online communications held by
third-party network service providers without first obtaining a warrant
based on probable cause.12 Third, most providers are private actors and
may therefore disclose stored communications without violating the Fourth
Amendment.13

A. Legislative History of the SCA
In October 1985, the Office of Technology Assessment issued a
report entitled “Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties,” which
concluded that “current legal protections for electronic mail are weak,
ambiguous, or non-existent,” and that “electronic mail remains legally as
well as technically vulnerable to unauthorized surveillance.”14 One year
later, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“ECPA”), and with it 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712, or the SCA, “to update and
clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic
changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies.”15 The
Senate Report on the SCA highlights Congress’s desire to extend to
electronic communications the underlying privacy protections already
afforded to postal mail and private telephone conversations:
A letter sent by first class mail is afforded a high level of protection
against unauthorized opening by a combination of constitutional
provisions, case law, and U.S. Postal Service statutes and regulations.
Voice communications transmitted via common carrier are protected
by title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.

10

Id. at 1210.
Miller, 425 U.S at 443.
12
Kerr, supra note 5, at 1212.
13
Id.
14
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3358.
15
Id. at 1.
11

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

41

But there are no comparable Federal statutory standards to protect the
privacy and security of communications transmitted by new
noncommon carrier communications services or new forms of
telecommunications and computer technology. This is so, even though
American citizens and American businesses are using these new forms
of technology in lieu of, or side-by-side with, first class mail and
common carrier telephone services.16

In passing ECPA, Congress sought to promote technological
innovation, encourage the commercial use of “innovative communications
systems,” discourage unauthorized users from obtaining access to
communications to which they are not a party, and establish clearer
standards to protect both law enforcement officials from liability and the
admissibility of legitimately obtained evidence.17 Congress explicitly
sought to achieve a “fair balance between the privacy expectations of
American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies.”18
The Senate Report on the SCA plainly indicates Congress’s intent
to protect certain information stored electronically in the same manner as
information stored locally: “With the advent of computerized recordkeeping
systems, Americans have lost the ability to lock away a great deal of
personal and business information . . . . For the person or business whose
records are involved, the privacy or proprietary interest in that information
should not change.”19 This sentiment is repeated throughout the report:
“Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or it will
gradually erode as technology advances. Congress must act to protect the
privacy of our citizens. If we do not, we will promote the gradual erosion
of this precious right.”20 The SCA’s fundamental parts reflect Congress’s
dueling priorities of promoting technological innovation while securing
reasonable expectations of privacy, as the next section explains.

B. Key Components of the SCA
The SCA affords privacy protections to online communications
held by two types of Internet service providers (“ISPs”): providers of
electronic communication services (“ECS”) and providers of remote
computing services (“RCS”).21 The SCA defines ECS as “any service
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or
16

Id. at 5.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 3.
20
Id. at 5. For a more detailed discussion of how these sentiments demonstrate
Congress’s intent to establish additional protections under law designed to limit the
scope of the TPRD, see Part I.C.
21
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
17
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electronic communications.”22 By way of example, Google or Yahoo! acts
as an ECS provider when a user employs the Gmail or Yahoo! Mail service
to send or receive an e-mail.23 The SCA defines RCS as “the provision to
the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an
electronic communications system.”24 For example, Amazon acts as an
RCS provider when a user employs Amazon Cloud Drive to store data
remotely for long-term safekeeping.
In determining whether the SCA covers an ISP, the first inquiry is
whether the ISP storing the communication is acting as a provider of ECS
or RCS with regard to that communication.25 If the ISP is acting as neither,
then the SCA does not apply to the communication at issue.26 These
classifications necessarily depend on the context of the implicated
communications: “the key is the provider’s role with respect to a particular
copy of a particular communication, rather than the provider’s status in the
abstract.”27 Importantly, ISPs can (and often do) function as both ECS and
RCS providers.28
The SCA categorizes online information into content and noncontent information and affords different standards of protection to each.29
Content information generally consists of the user’s actual communications,
whereas non-content information generally includes records and other
information pertaining to the user.30 The SCA prohibits ECS providers
from voluntarily divulging content information held in electronic storage to
third parties.31 It also prohibits RCS providers from voluntarily divulging
content information to third parties, but only when the RCS provider
maintains the information “solely for the purpose of providing storage or
computer processing services to [the] subscriber or customer.”32 The SCA
is more permissive respecting voluntary disclosure to government entities,
and prohibits only disclosure of non-content information by both ECS and
22

Id. § 2510(15).
See Kerr, supra note 5, at 1216 (explaining distinctions between providers of
electronic communication services and providers of remote computing services);
see also Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that
the statutory definition of an ECS provider includes basic e-mail services).
24
18 U.S.C. § 2711(2).
25
Kerr, supra note 5, at 1213.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 1215.
28
Id.
29
Simon M. Baker, Unfriending the Stored Communications Act: How
Technological Advancement and Legislative Inaction Have Rendered Its
Protections Obsolete, 22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 88 (2011).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 89.
32
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2)(B) (2012).
23
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RCS providers.33 Furthermore, these provisions apply only when the ISP is
providing a service to the public.34 This latter inquiry is fairly
straightforward: an entity is providing a service to the public if it provides
that service to “the community at large,” irrespective of whether it charges a
fee.35 Most university and government e-mail accounts are non-public
providers and therefore are not covered by the SCA.36
While § 2702 regulates voluntary disclosure of content and noncontent information, § 2703 regulates the processes by which government
entities may compel network service providers to release electronically
stored information. The government may compel the disclosure of content
information from an RCS provider in three ways.37 First, the government
may require disclosure without providing notice to the subscriber or
customer “if the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the
case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of
competent jurisdiction.”38 The second and third means of compelling
disclosure of content information from RCS providers require the
government to provide notice to the subscriber or customer.39 After
satisfying the prior-notice requirement, the government may obtain either
“an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or
grand jury trial,” or “a court order for such disclosure under § 2703(d).”40
For ECS providers, the government must adhere to certain timetable
requirements for compelling disclosure. If the content information is held
in electronic storage for 180 days or fewer, the government must obtain a
warrant to compel disclosure.41 If the content information is held in
electronic storage for more than 180 days, the government may compel
disclosure after providing prior notice and obtaining either an administrative
subpoena or a court order.42
For the communication at issue to be covered by the rules
governing ECS, it must be held in “electronic storage,” as that term is
defined in the statute.43 The SCA provides two definitions of electronic

33

Baker, supra note 29, at 89.
Id.
35
Anderson Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042–43 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
36
See Kerr, supra note 5, at 1216.
37
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. § 2703(a).
42
Id. § 2703(a)–(b).
43
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 982 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
34
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storage.44 The first definition includes “any temporary, intermediate storage
of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof.”45 The second definition of electronic storage
includes “any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication.”46 Neither the statute nor the legislative history provides a
definition for the term “purposes of backup protection,” and, consequently,
courts have struggled with its interpretation.47

C. The Third-Party Records Doctrine and the SCA
Scholarly defenses of the TPRD include arguments that the
protections of the Fourth Amendment do not extend to property controlled
by others,48 and that the doctrine is advantageous in the face of
technological change because it is technology-neutral.49 Such justifications
are insufficient, however, in a highly interconnected world where Congress
has failed to create an adaptable standard for additional protection of
content as technology advances.
Sections A and B of this Part provide background on the SCA and
discuss Congress’s purpose behind the Act. Preserving the “privacy and
security of communications transmitted by new noncommon carrier
communications services or new forms of telecommunications and
computer technology” was of paramount importance to Congress.50
Congress was, for the time, technology-neutral in this language—it did not
limit protections to electronic mail or computer-based bulletin boards;
rather, it used these as examples to contrast with prior technologies such as
the postal service or telephones.51 Congress noted that the content of
communications was often the same,52 but that the protections afforded

44

18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
Id. § 2510(17)(A).
46
Id. § 2510(17)(B).
47
See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (noting the lack of definition for “purposes of
backup protection”).
48
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561, 589 (2009) (“By knowingly disclosing information to a third party, an
individual consents to another person having control over it.”).
49
See, e.g., id. at 579–81.
50
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
51
Id.
52
See id. (“American citizens and American businesses are using these new forms
of technology in lieu of, or side-by-side with, first class mail and common carrier
telephone services.” (emphasis added)).
45
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identical content through different communications systems were vastly
different.53
This language is critical to understanding the role and purpose of
the SCA as respects the TPRD. Congress was not oblivious to the existence
of the doctrine,54 and viewed the necessity of affording protections to such
communications—whether in transit under ECPA, or in storage under the
SCA—as critical in limiting the reach of the TPRD. Nor did Congress
intend this protection to be limited either to criminal investigations or to
Federal jurisdiction—both the Senate Report55 and the final language of the
statute itself support the intent that these be very broad protections.
Why then did the SCA not achieve this goal? As described in Part
II of this Article, the failure lies in the final statutory language, which
perhaps in an attempt to be technology-neutral, created ambiguity that was
substantially technology-specific. This language, drafted in the 1980s,
failed to provide an easily adaptable framework.56 The result is a
circumstance in which courts must interpret whether, and if so to what
extent, users of a new technology enjoy Fourth Amendment-like privacy
interests in the content of communications using modern technologies such
as Facebook, Google, and Apple’s iPhone. Such an outcome could be
desirable if the underlying statute provided a framework clarifying what
types of activities and interests Congress sought to protect.
Unfortunately, as Part II of this Article suggests, the SCA provides
anything but such a framework—leaving substantial ambiguity resulting in
53

Id. at 5.
Id. at 3 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), for the proposition
that records subject to control by a third party computer operator may be subject to
no constitutional privacy protection).
55
See id. at 4 (noting the broad scope of the TPRD).
56
An alternative approach Congress might have employed, had it felt a technologyneutral framework could not be drafted without leaving too much interpretive
ambiguity to the courts, would have been to provide a technology-specific
framework that would expressly require Congress, perhaps through sunset
provisions, to revisit the framework as technology advanced. This approach seems
suboptimal, however, as a priori timing the sunset provisions to the development of
new technology would be difficult. Additionally, such provisions might risk
political inaction overturning policy that otherwise would remain intact. A third
alternative, delegating the responsibility for updating these provisions to an
administrative agency, might have facial appeal but could be more costly over the
long term. Additionally, such delegation could face challenges as the expertise
required might span several agencies (e.g., the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, the Department of Justice, the Federal Communications Commission,
etc.) and thus further increase costs. Therefore, a technology-neutral approach
embedded in statutory language likely was and likely remains the most appropriate
option.
54
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disparate judicial outcomes. Nonetheless, while the 1986 language of the
statute fails to provide clarity for modern-day technology, Congress’s
original intent is clear—a desire to provide heightened protections for
communications content in the face of advancing technology, specifically
including limitations on the TPRD.

D. Civil Discovery and the SCA
For the practitioners slugging it out in the trenches, the SCA plays a
significant role in civil litigation strategy. While FRCP 4557 generally
governs subpoenas in federal courts, and FRCP 2658 generally governs
discovery requests in federal courts, the SCA specifically applies to
subpoena requests issued to nonparties.59 As such, the SCA governs
subpoena requests issued to Internet communications content holders, such
as Yahoo!, Facebook, and Google.
More and more, parties routinely seek discovery of communications
shared and stored on social networking platforms. Consequently, courts
must not only grapple with the various state and federal procedure rules
governing the discovery of electronically stored information, but also devise
methods by which parties can obtain relevant social media content—such as
status updates, private chats, and protected tweets—without violating
established privacy protections. While different courts have fashioned
different methods60 to facilitate the exchange of such content between the
parties, absent the SCA, courts would often face the privacy-offensive
result of granting litigants’ requests to compel wholesale disclosure of
communications content by nonparties because of the TPRD.61
Yet, the SCA’s outdated language compels courts to engage in
unnecessary statutory analyses to determine the extent to which particular
communications are covered.62 For instance, in In re Jetblue Airways Corp.
57

FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
59
Rudolph J. Burshnic, Applying the Stored Communications Act to the Civil
Discovery of Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259, 1277 (2012).
60
See, e.g., Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., No. 1:10-1789, 2011 WL 2491371,
at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2011) (conducting an in camera review of Plaintiff’s
Facebook account to determine what content is discoverable); Gallion v. Gallion,
No. FA114116955S, 2011 WL 4953451, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011)
(ordering counsel for each party in a divorce proceeding to exchange their clients’
Facebook and dating website login credentials).
61
See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 F. Supp 2d 606, 609 (E.D.
Va. 2008) (upholding a magistrate judge’s order quashing a subpoena seeking a
nonparty’s e-mails from AOL because the SCA does not provide an exemption for
such disclosure).
62
See infra Part II.
58
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Privacy Litigation, a class of plaintiffs asserted, among other claims, that
JetBlue violated ECPA “by divulging stored passenger communications
without the passengers’ authorization or consent.”63 While JetBlue CEO
David Neelman publicly acknowledged64 that the company had violated its
own privacy policy by transferring its customer’s personal identifying
information to a private data mining company, the New York district court
nevertheless dismissed plaintiffs’ ECPA claims. Because JetBlue was acting
as neither a provider of ECS nor RCS, the judge ruled, the SCA did not
apply to the communications in question.65
The Jetblue court principally relied on the holdings in Crowley v.
CyberSource Corp. and Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP.66 In Crowley, a
district court in California held that the “online merchant Amazon.com was
not an electronic communication service provider despite the fact that it
maintained a website and receives electronic communications containing
personal information from its customers in connection with the purchase of
goods.”67 In Andersen, the court “drew a distinction between companies
that purchase Internet services and those that furnish such services as a
business, and found that a company that purchases Internet services, such as
e-mail, just like any other consumer, is not an electronic communication
service provider within the meaning of the ECPA.”68
As discussed above, in the context of discovery between the
parties, the normal civil discovery process at least provides the parties
opportunities to fully address the issue before disclosure—thus entrusting
the issue of privacy protections to the adversarial system.69 Yet, in the
63

In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 306 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
64
Id. at 305.
65
Id. at 309–10.
66
Id. at 308 (citing Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) and Anderson Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill.
1998)).
67
Id. (citing Crowley, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1270).
68
Id. (citing Andersen, 991 F. Supp. at 1043).
69
It may also be the case that the adversarial civil discovery process provides
insufficient protections; that question is outside the scope of this Article. However,
courts in such circumstances should at least consider the fact that, as discussed
above, Congress passed the SCA in response to the TPRD and, accordingly, to what
degree civil discovery requests of electronic material must be narrowly tailored to
protect against privacy violations stemming from over-broad requests. For
example, by way of analogy to the physical world, a discovery request of an entity
for all its files pertaining to “Benzene” would not entitle the discovering party
general access to the entity’s files on employee discipline. Yet, in the case
of Gallion v. Gallion, that is precisely what occurred—by turning over access
credentials to the social networking platform Facebook, the parties effectively

48

REASONABLE EXPECTIONS OF PRIVACY SETTINGS [Vol. 13

context of disclosure requests served on nonparties, absent the SCA’s
protections—in a world where nearly all communications are facilitated and
stored by third parties—requests served on third parties would become a
“backdoor” to the discovery process, taking it out of the hands of the normal
civil litigation process. Such a fundamental change to civil discovery
procedures was not what Congress contemplated as evidenced by its
enactment of the SCA and specifically the § 2702 confidentiality limitations
on voluntary disclosure.

II. INTERPRETIVE DIFFERENCES WITHIN SCA JURISPRUDENCE
Courts across the country have embraced varying and often
contradictory interpretations of the SCA’s language, especially when
applying it to modern technology that did not exist at the time of the Act’s
enactment.

A. The Split: Whether Opened E-mails are Held in “Electronic
Storage”
Whether an ISP is acting as a provider of ECS or RCS with regard
to a particular communication is a critical distinction due to the different
privacy protections afforded to each type of provider. This distinction is
especially challenging to determine in the context of opened e-mails, and
there is a genuine split as to whether opened e-mails are held in “electronic
storage” for the purposes of the SCA. The traditional approach,
promulgated by the Department of Justice and embraced by most courts,70
maintains that opened e-mails are not held in “electronic storage” because
they are not backup copies of incidental wire or electronic communications
held in temporary or intermediate storage.71 This interpretation assumes
that the second definition of “electronic storage”—“any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of
turned over the keys to the entire filing room and allowed them unrestricted ability
to search it, rather than only having the party produce the relevant files.
70
COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf; see also Fraser v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635–38 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (concluding that alreadyaccessed e-mails are not in “electronic storage”), aff’d in part and vacated in part,
352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003).
71
See Orin S. Kerr, South Carolina Supreme Court Creates Split with Ninth Circuit
on Privacy in Stored E-mails—and Divides 2-2-1 on the Rationale, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 10, 2012, 4:24 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/10/10/sourthcarolina-supreme-court-deepens-split-on-privacy-in-stored-e-mails-and-divides-22-1-on-the-rationale/ (noting that the traditional view adopted by the DOJ is that
subsection (B) refers to backup copies in subsection (A)).
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backup protection of such communication”—contained in subsection (B) of
§ 2510(17)) applies only to messages in subsection (A).72
The Ninth Circuit in Theofel v. Farey-Jones rejected this reading of
§ 2510(17), explaining that the phrase “such communication” in subsection
(B) “does not, as a matter of grammar, reference attributes of the type of
storage defined in subsection (A).”73 Therefore, the court analyzed whether
the e-mails at issue fit the definition in either subsection (A) or subsection
(B). The court held that e-mail messages delivered to and retrieved by a
user and stored by an ISP were stored for “purposes of backup
protection”—falling squarely under subsection (B)—and were therefore
protected under the ECS rules.74 The court reasoned that users frequently
rely on e-mail servers to preserve e-mail messages in the event the user
accidentally erases or misplaces the original messages, and concluded that
“prior access is irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in
electronic storage.”75 Under Theofel, “what matters is not whether the email has been accessed, but rather whether the e-mail ‘has expired in the
normal course.’”76
In United States v. Weaver, an Illinois district court attached
significant weight to the particular e-mail system at issue in Theofel, noting
that the Ninth Circuit relied “on the assumption that users download e-mails
from an ISP’s server to their own computers.”77 In Weaver, the e-mail
system at issue was a Hotmail account, which is “web-based” and
“remote.”78 The Weaver court reasoned that communications stored on
web-based e-mail systems are not stored for purposes of backup protection,
but rather are maintained “solely for the purpose of providing storage or
computer processing services,” and therefore must be governed by the RCS
rules.79 But therein lies an important distinction. The reasoning in Weaver
assumes that the determination of whether an ISP is a provider of ECS or
RCS turns on the ISP’s intentions, and not those of the user, with regard to
the communication at issue. The Weaver court states:
[U]nless a Hotmail user varies from default use, the remote computing
service is the only place he or she stores messages, and Microsoft is
not storing that user’s opened messages for backup purposes. Instead,
Microsoft is maintaining the messages “solely for the purpose of
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providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber
or customer.”80

The Weaver decision ultimately turned on the intentions of the ISP and not
those of the user. Yet, as the Ninth Circuit in Theofel noted, “nothing in the
Act requires that the backup protection be for the benefit of the ISP rather
than the user.”81
The Weaver court further argued that the decision in Theofel cannot
be squared with legislative history.82 For instance, the court cited a passage
from the House Report on the SCA, which includes in part the following
language: “Sometimes the addressee, having requested and received a
message, chooses to leave it in storage on the service for re-access at a later
time. The Committee intends that . . . such communication should continue
to be covered by section 2702(a)(2),” which governs RCS providers.83 But
the Ninth Circuit addressed this point in Theofel and explained that the ECS
rules would also apply, just as both the RCS and ECS rules govern alreadyaccessed e-mails: “If section 2702(a)(2) applies to e-mail even before
access, the committee could not have been identifying an exclusive source
of protection, since even the government concedes that unopened e-mail is
protected by the electronic storage provisions.”84
The ECS–RCS distinction can also be outcome-determinative in the
context of civil liability. In Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., the
attachment of civil liability turned on whether Arch Wireless, a private
company that provided text-messaging pager services to the city of Ontario,
was acting as a provider of ECS or RCS with regard to stored text
messages.85 The district court held that Arch Wireless, acting as a provider
of RCS, was permitted to release transcripts of private text messages under
the exemption in § 2702(b)(3) because it had obtained consent from the
city, which was a “subscriber” for the purposes of the statutory exemption.
The determination that Arch Wireless was acting as a provider of RCS was
critical because ECS providers are not exempt from liability for releasing
such content even if they obtain permission from a subscriber.86
The Ninth Circuit reversed and found that Arch Wireless was a
provider of ECS.87 Interpreting the “plain language of the SCA, including
80
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its common-sense definitions,” the Ninth Circuit argued that the definition
of an ECS provider (“any service which provides to users thereof the ability
to send or receive wire or electronic communications”) describes exactly the
function Arch Wireless was contracted to provide.88 The court contrasted
this function with that of an RCS provider, explaining that “before the
advent of advanced computer processing programs such as Microsoft Excel,
businesses had to farm out sophisticated processing to a service that would
process the information.”89 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit relied on
Theofel, writing, “Although it is not clear for whom Arch Wireless
‘archived’ the text messages—presumably for the user or Arch Wireless
itself—it is clear that the messages were archived for “backup protection,”
just as they were in Theofel.”90
The split deepened further in 2012 when the Supreme Court of
South Carolina rejected the holding in Theofel and found that e-mail
messages stored on a web-based e-mail system are not held in electronic
storage. In Jennings v. Jennings, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
considered whether an individual, who, without authorization, accessed
another user’s web-based Yahoo! Mail account and retrieved alreadyaccessed e-mails, was subject to civil liability under § 2701 of the SCA.91
Lee Jennings initiated the lawsuit when he learned that his wife’s daughterin-law had correctly guessed the security questions associated with his
Yahoo! Mail account and accessed his e-mails in order to obtain
information about an alleged affair.92 The action turned on whether the emails were held in electronic storage as defined by the SCA. If the e-mails
were found to fall outside the statute’s definition of electronic storage, then
Jennings would be precluded from advancing a claim under § 2701.
Specifically, the court considered whether the e-mails were stored for
“purposes of backup protection.”93
Previously, the South Carolina Court of Appeals applied, or perhaps
extended, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Theofel to find that the e-mail
messages maintained on the web-based e-mail system were held in
electronic storage.94 The court first found that Yahoo! was acting as an
ECS provider with regard to the e-mails at issue, specifically noting that
Yahoo! “was providing email services to [Jennings] at the time the emails at
issue were accessed.”95 The court next considered whether the e-mails at
88
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issue were stored for purposes of backup protection, and found that “the
previously opened e-mails were stored on Yahoo’s servers so that, if
necessary, [Jennings] could access them again.”96 The court made express
reference to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Theofel, writing: “Like the Ninth
Circuit, we believe that one of the purposes of storing a backup copy of an
email message on an ISP’s server after it has been opened is so that the
message is available in the event that the user needs to retrieve it again.”97
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, rejected this
interpretation, holding instead that the retention of an opened e-mail does
not constitute storage for purposes of backup protection under the Act.98
The Jennings court placed substantial weight on the dictionary definition of
the word “backup,” which Merriam–Webster Dictionary defines as “one
that serves as a substitute or support.”99 The court (incorrectly)100
concluded that web-based e-mail systems maintain only a single copy of an
e-mail message, and held that the e-mails were not maintained for purposes
of backup protection. Therefore, the e-mails were not held in electronic
storage for purposes of the SCA.101
Notably, South Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Toal, while
concurring in the result, explained that the exact definition of “backup”
varies from dictionary to dictionary, and application of the definition
proffered in the majority opinion (“backup” defined as “one that serves as a
substitute or support”) may very well suggest that an e-mail message on an
ISP’s server could be stored for support in the event that the user needs to
retrieve it.102 Under this definition, the e-mail can be considered stored for
purposes of backup protection despite whether or not there exists a second
copy.103 Chief Justice Toal instead relied on the statutory and historical
context of the phrase “backup protection,” writing that the “‘traditional
interpretation’ of the [SCA], advanced by the Department of Justice,
coupled with the fact that Congress never contemplated this new form of
technology, provide a sounder basis to reach [a] decision.”104 This
approach, however, places inordinate emphasis on the technology of 1986
and does not afford due consideration to the privacy concerns at the heart of
96
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the SCA, as evidenced by the legislative history. Additionally, as discussed
above in Part I, Section C, the Senate Report discussing the SCA suggests
that Congress was not trying to “contemplate [a] new form of technology,”
but rather was trying (if albeit unsuccessfully) to develop a technologyneutral definition for affording protections to emerging technology.

B. Social Media and the SCA
Application of the SCA in the context of social media poses
numerous practical and legal challenges. For one, the scope of the SCA is
limited to electronic communications “not intended to be available to the
public.”105 Yet recent court decisions suggest that some communications
made via social networking platforms may receive SCA protections, even if
they were disclosed to hundreds or even thousands of third parties.
1. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc.
In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., a California district court
considered whether the SCA applies to communications shared and stored
on social networking platforms.106 The three social networking platforms at
issue were Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple.107 In finding that all
three sites provide private messaging or e-mail services, the court concluded
that each platform is an ECS provider.108 The Crispin court further held
that each social networking platform could also serve as an RCS
provider.109 Specifically, the Crispin court wrote:
As respects messages that have not yet been opened, those entities
operate as ECS providers and the messages are in electronic storage
because they fall within the definition of “temporary, intermediate
storage” under § 2510(17)(A). As respects messages that have been
opened and retained by Crispin . . . [Facebook, MySpace, and Media
Temple] operate as RCS providers providing storage services under §
2702(a)(2).110

Under this analysis, a social networking platform would be prohibited
from voluntarily “divulging to any person or entity the contents of a
105
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communication” made through an e-mail or private message, without first
obtaining proper authorization. Under the reasoning in Crispin, unopened
private messages maintained for fewer than 180 days are governed by the
ECS provisions, and social networking platforms may only disclose them if
the government presents a valid warrant. Opened private messages are
governed by the less stringent RCS provisions: the government must
provide notice to the user and need only present the social networking
platform with a trial subpoena or court order in order to obtain them.
The Crispin court embraced the reasoning in Weaver, finding that
opened messages on social networking platforms should be governed by the
RCS provisions.111 It also denied that its finding conflicted with Ninth
Circuit precedent and instead insisted that its holding is supported by dicta
in Theofel.112 Yet Theofel expressly states that “prior access is irrelevant to
whether the messages at issue were in electronic storage.”113 If the Crispin
court found (as it did) that Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple are
providers of ECS, then it should not matter if the messages have been
accessed by the recipient.114 Accordingly, the Crispin court quite clearly
departed from Theofel in finding that Facebook, MySpace, and Media
Temple are ECS providers but acted as RCS providers with regard to the
opened messages, when Theofel found no such shift in ISP designation.
The Crispin court also considered whether Facebook wall posts and
MySpace comments are eligible to receive protection under the SCA.115
First, the court analyzed whether wall posts and comments can be defined
as being held in electronic storage.116 Applying the definition from
subsection (A), the court found that wall postings and comments are not
protectable as forms of temporary, intermediate storage because, unlike email, there is no step whereby comments or wall posts must be opened.117
But the court, relying on a critically important analogy, found that wall
posts and comments are stored for purposes of backup protection and are
therefore covered by the definition from subsection (B).118 The court
analogized wall posts and comments to messages on an electronic bulletin
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board service (“BBS”)119—technology that not only existed in 1986, but
also was expressly included in the legislative history.120
2. Analogizing Wall Posts and Comments to Private BBS Messages
The Senate Report on the SCA defines BBSs as “communications
networks created by computer users for the transfer of information among
computers,” and notes that “these may take the form of proprietary systems
or they may be noncommercial systems operating among computer users
who share special interests.”121 The Report acknowledges that BBSs made
available to the public are not covered by the SCA, since facilitators of
publicly-accessible bulletin boards effectively authorize anyone to access
the communications.122 The statute reflects this in § 2511(2)(g): “It shall
not be unlawful for any person . . . to intercept or access an electronic
communication made through an electronic communication system that is
configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to
the general public.”123
The Crispin court relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. to conclude that postings, once made, are
stored for purposes of backup protection.124 In Konop, the Ninth Circuit
considered whether an employer violated the SCA when he accessed
without authorization a private BBS, which was maintained by Konop.125
The Ninth Circuit expressly stated that the website was a provider of ECS
and that the communications on the website were held in electronic storage.
Importantly, the court considered the steps taken by Konop to restrict access
to the public:
Konop controlled access to his website by requiring visitors to log in
with a user name and password. He created a list of people, mostly
pilots and other employees of Hawaiian, who were eligible to access
the website . . . Konop programmed the website to allow access when
a person entered the name of an eligible person, created a password,
and clicked the “SUBMIT” button on the screen, indicating acceptance
of the terms and conditions of use. These terms and conditions
prohibited any member of Hawaiian’s management from viewing the
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website and prohibited users from disclosing the website’s contents to
anyone else.126

Following this reasoning, the Crispin court found that if a user
sufficiently restricts access to communications displayed on his social
media account, those communications may be covered by the SCA.127
Specifically, the court stated that “the passive action of failing to delete a
BBS post, which is in all material ways analogous to a Facebook wall
posting or a MySpace comment, also results in that post being stored for
backup purposes.”128 Accordingly, the court held that “Facebook and
MySpace are ECS providers as respects wall postings and comments and
that such communications are in electronic storage.”129 This finding would
require the government to obtain a warrant in order to compel disclosure of
sufficiently restricted wall posts and comments.
But the Crispin court did not stop there: “In the alternative, the
court holds that Facebook and MySpace are RCS providers as respects the
wall postings and comments.”130 This alternative conclusion rests largely
on the reasoning in Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.131 In
Viacom, a New York district court determined that YouTube acted as a
provider of RCS with regard to user-uploaded videos, which the user
designated as private via YouTube’s privacy settings.132 The Crispin court
analogized these restricted YouTube videos to restricted wall postings and
comments, finding that in both instances, the webpages are storing content
“for the benefit of the user and those the user designates.”133 The Crispin
court’s reasoning is both conflicted and irresolute, and thus fails to clarify
the SCA’s applicability to communications made via social networking
platforms.
This analysis provides support for our recommendations, discussed
below in Part III, that the SCA suggests that Congress intended the scope of
the TPRD to have limits respecting certain types of activities and content,
such as communications. Furthermore, this analysis supports our
concurrence with Professor Kerr’s suggestion that ECPA and the SCA be
amended to establish a single definition protecting all types of
communication in-transit and in-storage with a single, equal standard of
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protection requiring a warrant for access in most instances of criminal
investigation.
While it remains unclear whether communications shared and
stored on social networking platforms should be governed by the ECS or
RCS rules, the foregoing case law certainly suggests that certain social
media users are entitled to some protection under the SCA. In Crispin, the
court considered whether the communicator put in place sufficient privacy
restrictions. This logic aligns with Congress’s explicit intent in enacting the
SCA: to achieve a “fair balance between the privacy expectations of
American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies.”134
Moreover, well-established principles of statutory construction compel a
reading of the SCA that “effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose
of the legislative draftsmen.”135
This Article suggests that Congress should amend the SCA to
include already-accessed communications made via social networking
platforms.136 Currently, the Crispin line of reasoning suggests the threshold
question of whether wall posts and comments even fall under the SCA’s
coverage at all hinges on the sufficiency of the user’s privacy settings.137
Thus, we suggest that social networking platforms should have available
privacy settings to restrict access in a manner sufficient for courts to
analogize these platforms to private BBSs. This approach raises at least two
important questions. First, to what extent must users restrict access to their
profiles in order to enjoy the protections of the SCA?138 Second, are the
available privacy settings sufficiently effective so as to make the platform
inaccessible to the public?
134
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3. Social Media Privacy Settings: How Private is Private?
Because social networking platforms provide varying channels of
communication, users will eventually and necessarily foster varying
expectations of privacy with regard to each channel. But the SCA does not
afford protections according to reasonable expectations of privacy. The Act
instead compels application of language written for the technology of 1986.
As a result, users can receive heightened protections for communications
displayed to thousands of users, but lesser protections for private messages
shared between only two people.139 The results of these interpretations may
frustrate Congressional purpose as indicated in the Senate Report, thus
suggesting that existing interpretation, which affords different levels of
protection to different technologies, may be improper.140 Until Congress
revisits the SCA, courts have options to address this distinction and afford
more consistent levels of protection commensurate with Congress’s
intent.141 The Crispin court’s conclusion that wall posts and comments can
be analogized to BBSs relies on the assumption that the available privacy
settings are even capable of being sufficiently restrictive. Therefore, an
assessment of privacy settings on social networking platforms is
appropriate.
A recent study published in the Carnegie Mellon Journal of Privacy
and Confidentiality uses data from a longitudinal panel of 5,076 Facebook
users to survey how their privacy and disclosure behavior changed between
2005—the early days of the Facebook network—and 2011.142 The study
highlights three contrasting trends:
First, over time Facebook users in our dataset exhibited increasingly
privacy-seeking behavior, progressively decreasing the amount of
personal data shared publicly with unconnected profiles in the same
network. However, and second, changes implemented by Facebook
near the end of the period of time under our observation arrested or in
some cases inverted that trend. Third, the amount and scope of
personal information that Facebook users revealed privately to other
connected profiles actually increased over time—and because of that,
so did disclosures to “silent listeners” on the network: Facebook itself,
third-party apps, and (indirectly) advertisers.143
139
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For the purposes of this analysis, it is the third trend that sheds most
light on the sufficiency of Facebook’s privacy settings. The finding that
disclosures users intended to be private were often revealed to third parties
such as advertisers and apps, unbeknownst to the user, underscores the
reality that privacy settings may not restrict content to the extent users—and
courts—might assume. For example, the study found that users often
unwittingly reveal their birthday, location, photos, and the location of
friends to third-party apps.144 More to the point, the study found that users
often estimate incorrectly how many other Facebook members have access
to their profile data: “social media users consistently underestimate their
audience size for their posts, guessing that their audience is just 27% of its
true size.”145 This speaks directly to whether Facebook’s privacy settings
are sufficiently restrictive so as to equate wall posts to private BBS
messages.
A study published by the Department of Computer Science at
Columbia University found similar results.146 The study investigated
whether users’ Facebook privacy settings matched their sharing intentions
and concluded that Facebook’s current approach to privacy settings is
“fundamentally flawed.”147 Participants of the study completed intentions
forms, which required the participants to indicate whether certain profile
groups148 could access certain information categories.149 Participants were
informed that the information categories were based on content rather than
data type, and spanned all data types, including wall posts, photos, links,
and status updates.150 The study found that every single one of the 65
participants had at least one “sharing violation” based on their stated
sharing intentions.151 In other words, “every participant was sharing
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something they wished to hide, or was hiding something they wished to
share.”152
In addition, recent FTC consent orders concerning social
networking platforms’ privacy settings further question the appropriateness
of analogizing wall posts and comments to private BBS messages. In
November 2011, the FTC issued a consent order stemming from allegations
that Facebook “deceived consumers by telling them they could keep their
information on Facebook private, and then repeatedly allow[ed] it to be
shared and made public.”153 For example, the FTC found that Facebook
“told users they could restrict sharing of data to limited audiences—for
example with ‘Friends Only,’” when “in fact, selecting ‘Friends Only’ did
not prevent their information from being shared with third-party
applications their friends used.”154
Earlier that same year, the FTC took action involving the launch of
another social media platform. In March 2011, the FTC issued a consent
order stemming from allegations that Google “used deceptive tactics and
violated its own privacy promises when it launched its social network,
Google Buzz.”155 The complaint alleged that Google made deceptive
representations to consumers by suggesting that “consumers would be able
to exercise control over what information would be made public through
their Google public profile.”156 The FTC found that “the contacts with
whom users emailed and chatted the most would become public by default
and that user information submitted through other Google products would
be automatically broadcast through Buzz.”157
The foregoing studies and FTC consent orders suggest that privacy
settings on social networking platforms may not provide the sort of
restrictions that were present on private BBSs in 1986.158 For example, the
Senate Report on the SCA states specifically that § 2701 “does not prevent
broad authorizations to the general public to access such a facility.”159
Specifically, the Report states:
152
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The bill does not for example hinder the development or use of
‘electronic bulletin boards’ or other similar services where the
availability of information about the service, and the readily accessible
nature of the service are widely known and the service does not require
any special access code or warning to indicate that the information is
private.160

The Crispin court was quick to conclude that wall posts and comments
can safely be analogized to a private BBS message provided the
communicator of the wall posts and comments employed the available
privacy settings.161 Yet this conclusion relies on the assumption that the
available privacy settings on social networking platforms are sufficiently
restrictive. As the foregoing suggests, this assumption may not necessarily
be appropriate.162

III. AMENDING THE SCA
Parts I and II present a historical, operational, and jurisprudential
backdrop to the SCA. Part III suggests that Congress should amend the
SCA to provide heightened statutory protections for private electronic
communications—such as private e-mails stored on Gmail and private
messages saved on Facebook—where the user demonstrates a reasonable
expectation of privacy by employing sufficiently restrictive privacy settings.
Additionally, it suggests that even now, courts can (and some do) interpret
existing language and Constitutional protections to afford protection more
consistent with Congressional intent regarding private electronic
communications.
In 1976, the Supreme Court first recognized the TPRD in United
States v. Miller. Despite significant and substantial changes to
communication methods, interests, and expectations, the Supreme Court has
not revisited the TPRD. Professor Kerr opines in a recent Article that
“several lower courts have ruled that the Fourth Amendment fully protects
the contents of emails held by third party providers.”163 He cites the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Warshak and points to several district
court decisions that apply the Warshak reasoning to other forms of
communications content, such as “Facebook messages, text messages,
faxes, and password-protected websites.”164 In fact, Kerr concludes, “no
160
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court has reached the contrary result. Warshak has been adopted by every
court that has squarely decided the question.”165
Kerr concedes that the case law is not entirely settled: “only one
federal court of appeals has squarely addressed the issue.”166 As the
Supreme Court has yet to revisit the issue, Miller remains good law.
Therefore, while Kerr is correct to characterize the developing case law as
substantially supportive of Fourth Amendment protections for
communications content stored by third parties, the issue is far from settled.
An initial survey of recent federal decisions addressing related
issues in the privacy and technology context suggest that some courts might
be less inclined to follow the Warshak reasoning. For example, the Fifth
Circuit recently held that a mobile phone user does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in location data stored by a third-party mobile phone
service provider—even if that data is necessary for the provision of the
service.167 The Sixth Circuit held similarly in 2012,168 albeit in a ruling
somewhat less clear on the technological distinctions differentiating it from
United States v. Jones.169 Many of these decisions, notably including Jones,
call upon Congress to remedy these ambiguities and construct clear
guidelines in the privacy and technology context.170
Congressional action may take time. While a legislative remedy is
the most appropriate resolution, in the interim courts still have options to
preserve the level of privacy protections Congress sought to afford with the
SCA. This Article urges courts to follow the reasoning in Warshak and
require law enforcement to obtain a warrant in order to compel disclosure of
online communications content stored by third parties.
165
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See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
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involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may
be legislative. A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public
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Civil litigation poses a separate problem given the natural absence
of Fourth Amendment protection. As discussed supra in Part I, Section D,
this Article suggests that Congress intended for the SCA to create new
protections responsive to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, which
would prevent litigants from circumventing the discovery process. Courts
therefore should seek to limit discovery requests of communications content
shared and stored on social networking platforms in light of the SCA’s
legislative history.
In The Next Generation Communication Privacy Act, Professor
Kerr offers a thought experiment about “what might happen if Congress
repealed ECPA in its entirety and enacted a new privacy statute to replace
it.”171 Specifically, Professor Kerr suggests that this new privacy statute
should (1) impose the same warrant requirement on access to all contents;
(2) impose particularity requirements on the scope of disclosed metadata;
(3) impose minimization and non-disclosure rules on all accessed content;
and (4) impose a two-part territoriality regime with a mandatory rule
structure for United States-based users and a permissive regime for users
located abroad.172
While this Article largely agrees with Professor Kerr’s proposals, it
further suggests that Congress should adopt technology-neutral language in
a manner that will clarify the content subject to protection while leaving
sufficient flexibility for courts to apply the protections Congress intends to
future technologies. As discussed in Parts I and II of this Article, Congress
attempted to do so with the SCA but failed in drafting. The core challenge
in this task is creating technology-neutral language that can encompass asyet-undefined future technologies. Drafting such language is a plausible
goal—by focusing on the protection sought to be afforded, rather than on
the specific technology conveying the communication, Congress can
achieve this goal. This Article provides a modest suggestion for how, in
adopting a single standard for criminal and civil protection of stored
communications content, draft legislation might describe the bounds of that
protection:
Communications content stored on any interconnected information
system permitting communications among one or more individuals
where the system is configured or is configurable by individuals in
a manner sufficient either to demonstrate an expectation of privacy
or to allow those individuals the ability to demonstrate an
expectation of privacy.
The inclusion of language directed toward privacy settings reflects
the central tenets of Katz and its progeny. In Katz v. United States, the
171
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Supreme Court held that a defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of
privacy in telephone calls he made from a closeable public telephone
booth.173 The Court articulated the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test,
which requires a dual finding of a subjective expectation of privacy (on the
part of the communicator) and an objective expectation of privacy (one that
society finds as reasonable).174 The phone booth in Katz serves as an
appropriate analogy to privacy settings because both contexts evince
expectations of privacy.175 While the caller in Katz enjoyed Fourth
Amendment protections inside the closeable telephone booth, the Katz
opinion suggests that a similar level of protection would not have been
available to a public phone not housed in a closeable booth.176
As discussed in Part II, the privacy settings that allow users to
express clear intent are important to drawing boundaries in complex
information systems with both public and private components. This
concept is not new to the SCA.177 Likewise, it also has important roots in
physical-world Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Privacy settings in social
media and other advanced communications systems—when implemented
and employed effectively—sufficiently demonstrate an expectation of
privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Courts can take
notice of these settings and societal expectations, similar to the cases like
Katz discussed above, and implement the protections consistent with
language like that proposed in this Part. Congress should use such language
to adopt a uniform standard to protect communications content shared and
stored on social networking platforms where the user employs sufficiently
restrictive privacy settings.

CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, courts have embraced varying and often
contradictory interpretations of the SCA when applying it to technology that
did not exist at the time of the Act’s enactment. As a result, seemingly
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private electronic communications, such as e-mails stored on Gmail or
private messages saved on Facebook, may not receive full privacy
protections under the SCA, whereas semi-public wall posts could
potentially trigger the Act’s highest protections. In addition, there remains
substantial uncertainty as to the efficacy of privacy settings on some of the
most popular social networking platforms.
Accordingly, this Article suggests Congress amend the SCA in
order to ensure the Act achieves its original intent: providing universal
privacy protections for private electronic communications regardless of
whether those communications are in transit or in storage. This Article
further recommends Congress adopt technology-neutral statutory language
to more effectively protect communications content now and in the future.
This change not only better reflects the functionality of modern web-based
e-mail and messaging systems, but also more accurately incorporates the
drafters’ original intent. The Article suggests language to help effect this
goal, and also provides suggestions for how courts should act in the interim
to preserve the additional protections Congress created with the SCA, which
are directly responsive to the Supreme Court’s recognition of the TPRD in
United States v. Miller.

